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Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals is deservedly part of the ethical canon, 
but it is also be enormously and insistently absent-minded. I ’m going to 
first present, as a textual puzzle, a handful of forgetful moments in the first 
two essays of the Genealogy. To address the puzzle, I will take up a familiar 
idea, tha t the Genealogy is both a subversive account of ethics and of what 
it is to be an intellectual. I will describe a strategy for reading the text that 
makes these out to be differently and more closely connected than they are 
usually taken to be. That will allow me to address a persistent worry in the 
secondary literature, by explaining how the Genealogy’s criticism of morality 
can be something other than an instance of the genetic fallacy, yet also not 
lapse into one or another form of moralism. On the way, I will suggest that 
Nietzsche’s text requires us to modify one of the standard constraints on 
interpreting philosophical writing.
*My thanks to Sarah Buss, Ben Crowe, Ken Gemes, Brooke Hopkins, Chris Janaway 
and an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier drafts, to Lori Alward, R. Lanier 
Anderson, Pepe Chang, Nadeem Hussain and Kathrin Koslicki for helpful conversation, 
and to an audience at the Western Humanities Alliance’s 22nd Annual Conference. An 
ancestor of this material was presented at a conference on Moral Theory after Nietzsche 
hosted by the University of Texas; I’m grateful to commentator Robert Solomon, and for 
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First, the puzzle. You may recall tha t Nietzsche commences the argument of 
the Genealogy o f Morals by criticizing another account of the origin of moral­
ity, attributed to “English psychologists” : “‘[ojriginally.. .one approved un- 
egoistic actions and called them good from the point of view of those to 
whom they were done, tha t is to say, those to whom they were useful; later 
one forgot how this approval originated a n d ... felt them to b e ... good in 
themselves”’ ( l ^ ) .1 Nietzsche objects tha t this account “suffers from an 
inherent psychological absurdity... how is this forgetting possible? . . .  this 
utility h a s ... been an everyday experience at all tim es... consequently, in­
stead of fading from consciousness, instead of becoming easily forgotten, 
it must have been impressed on the consciousness more and more clearly” 
(1:3). Forgetting, Nietzsche is telling us, is harder than the British Empiri­
cists and their intellectual descendants think.2
Now you may also recall Nietzsche’s account of the origin of (what he 
calls) slave morality: very briefly, tha t the priestly classes of the ancient 
world invented an evaluative system for the downtrodden, according to 
which what their masters considered virtues (think of the virtues of Homeric 
heros) are evil, and the postures the slaves have no choice but to adopt (ser­
1For reasons I will shortly explain, I am going to do something that is now quite unusual 
in the literature, that of deploying Nietzschean texts only from the Genealogy itself. That 
permits the following convention: standalone references will be to the Genealogy, by essay 
and section, using P to indicate the Preface (so, the first citation above is to The Genealogy 
of Morals, Essay 1, sec. 2); I will use Walter Kaufmann’s translation (1989).
2The view being criticized is evidently paraphrased from Ree, 2003, pp. 98, 120-123, 
160-162. However, Paul Ree was a German of Jewish extraction, and so I take it that 
Nietzsche is using him merely as a representative of British Empiricism; the repetition 
of “English psychologists” (by my count the Preface and first Essay contain five variants 
on it) is quite emphatic. The core of British Empiricism, in the nineteenth century, was 
associationism, and Nietzsche picks out “the vis inertiae  of habit” and “a blind and chance 
mechanistic hooking-together of ideas” as preoccupations of “English psychologists” (1:1); 
at 3:4 he glosses the phrase “psychologischer contiguity” as “speaking with the English” 
(Kaufmann footnotes the use of the English word as an allusion to David Hume, but it 
was common property of the later Empiricists). Ree enthusiastically quotes Mill on “the 
primary law of association” (p. 101), and seems to be familiar with Hume and Bain as well 
(p. 104); he devotes much of The Origin of the Moral Sensations to explicitly associationist 
explanations of—in addition to the sense of ‘good’ and ‘bad’—the retributive theory of 
punishment (p. 114), the feeling of justice (p. 145), and the intrinsic desire to be admired 
(pp. 128, 130, 134f).
There is perhaps a further reason not to  assume Nietzsche means to  pick out Ree alone; 
of the ‘English psychologists,’ he says: “I am to ld ... th a t they a re . .. frogs... ” (1:1). 
Nietzsche knew Ree personally and even intimately, and one does not normally a ttribu te  













U n i v e r s i t y  o f  U t a h  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e p o s i t o r y
A uthor M anuscript
vility, submissiveness, willingness to tolerate abuse, and so on) are made out 
to be virtues—specifically, Christian virtues. The new evaluative structure 
was supplemented by a fantasied afterlife, in which the slaves were to be 
rewarded, and their enemies punished.
This account presents two related problems. The first, noticed by Rudi­
ger Bittner, is tha t the slaves compensate themselves for their suffering by 
inventing hell. But if the slaves have invented their revenge, they must know 
it’s imaginary; so how can they find it satisfying? The account only makes 
sense if the slaves have forgotten.3 The second, noticed by Brian Leiter
3Bittner, 1994. One might wonder whether division of labor is a way out of Bittner’s 
problem: the priests do the inventing for the slaves (so they know the afterlife is invented, 
but don’t need to find the revenge satisfying), and the slaves consume the priests’ invention 
(so they find the revenge satisfying, but never knew that it was a fantasy). However, this 
would require saddling Nietzsche with the implausible view that the priestly classes do 
not believe the doctrines of their religion, and do not find satisfaction in the fantasy 
of retribution. And that view is not just implausible in its own right, but textually 
implausible: for instance, at 1:15, Nietzsche quotes Tertullian at great length on the 
sufferings of the damned, and Tertullian is both a member of the priestly class, a church 
father no less, and portrayed as taking great anticipatory pleasure in those sufferings: 
Nietzsche describes him as “the enraptured visionary” .
Leiter objects to Bittner that unconscious or self-deceiving invention would do instead 
(2002, p. 203nl4); if you weren’t conscious of inventing the values, there’s nothing for you 
to forget. Alternatively, I have had it suggested to me that what the slaves are up to is 
not belief but rather suspension of disbelief; they are after the emotional rewards that 
playacting at righteous indignation brings. However, these proposals do not let us dismiss 
the problem, for reasons it will instructive to review.
We have over the past one hundred years become very comfortable with the concept of 
the unconscious, and we tend to treat it—even when we don’t accept Freudian psycho­
analytic theory—as an unproblematic primitive. So it’s easy to import an anachronistic 
conception of the conscious/unconscious distinction into a reading of Nietzsche. The point 
now is not that Nietzsche naively equated the mental with the conscious; quite the con­
trary. It is rather that Nietzsche was participating in a difficult intellectual innovation, 
and so we should expect his understanding of the distinction between the conscious and 
the unconscious to be very much his own. If we are going to attribute to the Genealogy 
the claim that the nonnoble classes invented slave morality, but unconsciously, we have to 
be able to gloss that adverb in a plausibly Nietzschean manner.
How can we determine what the distinction came to for Nietzsche? We could start in 
on the project of reconstructing his theoretical work on the topic, but because that is 
distributed over most of his middle- and late-period work, this is not the time and place 
for it. (Anderson, 2002, is indispensible reading, although I do not agree with all of his 
treatment.) Fortunately, there is a shortcut. I am about to argue that the Genealogy is 
intended to put on display what it is to engage in intellectually ambitious activity in an 
unselfaware and absentminded fashion. (Put slightly differently, for dramatic effect: the 
Genealogy is in the same business as the priestly classes, that of unconscious invention.) I 
am making a case to the effect that the narrator’s lack of self-awareness is implemented by 
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and others, is tha t of explaining how the masters could have been taken 
in by slave morality. One way or another, the masters have to forget an 
awful lot th a t’s perfectly obvious to them: tha t they’ve never seen hell or 
any reason to believe in it, tha t the slaves or priests who are telling them 
about it are (they think) dishonest and untrustworthy, and tha t i t ’s obvi­
ously some kind of revenge fantasy.4 Apparently, in the short space between 
criticizing the “English psychologists” and presenting his own alternative, 
Nietzsche has forgotten how hard forgetting is supposed to be. Nietzsche 
rubs it in by later referring back to the discussion of his predecessors: “To 
say it again—or haven’t I said it yet? [i.e., I ’ve already forgotten]—they are 
worthless” (2:4). And why worthless? Because they’ve forgotten  the history 
of morality.
The Genealogy's second essay starts out by announcing tha t ''forgetful­
ness. .. is . .. an active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of repres­
sion,” and tha t Nietzsche is going to describe how “one create [d] a memory 
for the human animal” (2:1, 3). But tha t description is itself incoherent. 
Humans are supposed to acquire a memory by being painfully trained into 
it. But if you don’t have a memory, you can’t be trained: it doesn’t m at­
ter how painful it was if, next time around, you don’t remember the pain.5 
That is, by the time he gets to the second essay, Nietzsche has forgotten 
his criticisms of the “English psychologists” ; and by the time he gets to
worth noting that earlier discussions of the problem of unconscious mental states—see, e.g., 
the chapter of Mill, 1865/1979, entitled “Sir William Hamilton’s Doctrine of Unconscious 
Mental Modifications”—had experimented with the idea that immediate forgetting could 
account for the phenomena adduced under that heading; the suggestion is not of course 
that Nietzsche had read Mill on Hamilton, but that such ideas were generally available in 
the culture.) If that case is plausible overall, then it instructs us that while it is not exactly 
wrong to describe the phenomenon Bittner is discussing as unconscious invention, if we 
are careful about how we attribute the conscious/unconscious distinction to Nietzsche, 
‘unconscious’ is tantamount to: forgotten with no time lapse.
We likewise need to ask ourselves what tools Nietzsche has for explaining suspension 
of disbelief. (We should not treat this as an acceptable primitive: the problematic phe­
nomenon that travels under this label is one of the larger unsolved problems of contem­
porary aesthetics.) The psychological machinery I am about to claim was Nietzsche’s 
is naturally extended to provide a explanation for it, but one on which it amounts to 
something on the order of directed forgetting; for further discussion, see note 15, below.
4Leiter, 2002, ch. 6; for the masters’ view of the slaves’ dishonesty, see 1.5. Nietzsche 
does not tell us outright that the masters take the priests to be untrustworthy, but he 
puts in place claims that entail that they should have: contemplative and thus unwarlike 
characters (Nietzsche explicitly lists priests under this heading) arouse the suspicions and 
mistrustfulness of a militarized society (3:10). The nobility’s accepting the deliverances 
of a priestly class requires explanation.
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his explanation of memory, he’s forgotten what it was tha t needed to be 
explained.
Perhaps the most interesting phenomemon in this neighborhood is that, 
while readers, as we’ve seen, occasionally notice the local problems, they 
almost never keep track of the commitments Nietzsche assumes in address­
ing them—that is, keep track of them long enough to notice the pattern of 
inconsistencies. I can confirm this anecdotally: I have taught the Genealogy 
a number of times, occasionally to classes of over a hundred students; there 
have been some very bright people in these classes, and they’ve been quite 
willing to point out difficulties in Nietzsche’s view. I’ve never had someone 
raise their hand and ask, apropos the trail of breadcrumbs I ’ve just pointed 
out, “But didn’t Nietzsche say, just a few pages back, th a t . .. ?” Moreover, 
the record is not merely anecdotal; none of the professional Nietzsche schol­
ars seem to have noticed tha t Nietzsche is dangling before his readers a series 
of inconsistencies having to do with memory and forgetting. Nietzsche has 
not only forgotten; he has managed to make his readers forget, too.6 W hat 
are we to make of this?
These are not by any means the only inconsistencies and sudden swerves 
with which the Genealogy presents us. Just for instance, in the very first 
phrase of the book, its author tells us tha t “we are unknown to ourselves,” 
and immediately follows the first-person plural pronouncement with a bit of 
intellectual autobiography tha t purports to exhibit considerable self-knowledge. 
Or again for instance, the Preface emphasizes the importance of “what is 
documented, what can actually be confirmed and has actually existed, in 
short the entire long heiroglyphic record, so hard to decipher, of the moral 
past of mankind” (P:7), and thus leads a first-time reader to expect care­
fully substantiated historical scholarship—as opposed to the Just So story 
which Nietzsche has attributed to English psychologists and dismissed.7 As
6Nietzsche is not unique in adopting this tactic; as, for instance, Bayard, 2000, 
esp. ch. 3, points out, the murder mystery genre requires that the clues be available 
to the reader, which means that concealing the solution requires making the reader not 
notice, or forget, the clues, and Bayard provides a very suggestive list of techniques used 
to this effect.
7And as Nietzsche’s genealogy is put in place, the force of the demand ought only to 
escalate. Nietzsche purports to explain the development of the value of truth; so at the 
outset of his reconstructed history, tru th  is hardly a concern at all; so Nietzsche has sys­
tematically impugned the veracity of his own primary sources. Worse, much of Nietzsche’s 
story is placed in what he repeatedly and insistently refers to as prehistory (2:2-3, 9, 14,
19; compare the longish quote from Daybreak at the end of 3:9): its subjects are “half­
animals” (Halbthieren, 2:16f) and “man-beasts” ( Thiermenschen, 2:20). Prehistory is the 
period from which we have no historical records, and protohumans are not to be expected 
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frequent readers know, what follows is not historical scholarship at all, but 
another Just So story. Nietzsche even provides us with a version of the Liar 
Paradox: an interlocutor’s query, as to just what Nietzsche thinks he is do­
ing, receives the response tha t erecting an ideal requires misunderstanding 
and slandering reality, and sanctifying lies (2:24); since Nietzsche is clearly 
on the way to new ideals himself (and the point of his remark is tha t his 
new ideals will involve destroying older ones), this is tantam ount to applying 
those descriptions to the Genealogy itself. That there are a great many such 
tensions and inconsistencies in Nietzsche’s text will turn  out to be a claim 
to which I am committed, and I will remark on some of those we encounter 
in the course of the coming argument; I am choosing to focus on the puzzle 
with which I began because the topic around which it is centered makes the 
contradictions unmistakably pointed: this is an author standing up, waving 
a large, brightly colored flag, and practically shouting to the skies, “I am 
contradicting myself!”
Analytically trained philosophers will nonetheless object at this point 
tha t attributing contradictions to a philosophical text is uncharitable, and 
should be allowed only as a very last resort. (The reading isn’t ‘noticed’ 
because i t’s a bad reading.) Surely we have not yet run out of resources 
for construing Nietzsche as consistent, and isn’t becoming adept at reading 
Nietzsche a m atter of learning to find thoughtful organization in what looks 
to his popular audience like exuberant chaos? So, before settling on this 
reading, I must construct and reject all possible alternative readings that 
purport to do away with the alleged inconsistencies. Instead of doing this, I 
will shortly discuss the application of the Principle of Charity itself, and later 
on, I will consider a Nietzschean strategy for short-circuiting the objection. 
But before I do that, I want to take up the more textual question, of what 
the relation between the form and the content of the Genealogy is supposed 
to be.
ical problems such a view poses, one would think that especially cautious and rigorous 
scholarly treatment would be in order. (However, perhaps Nietzsche is also intentionally 
providing incoherent chronological cues, in which case we cannot take his timelines at face 
value. For that suggestion, and supporting documentation, see Gemes, 2006.)
The note at the end of the first Essay further emphasizes the tension. In it, Nietzsche 
proposes a series of academic prize essays (a common institution at the time), and suggests 
that “perhaps this present book will serve to provide a powerful impetus in this direction” . 
He doesn’t quite go as far as suggesting his own writing as a model, but it is striking that 
no work that allowed itself as many historiographical liberties as the Genealogy could be 
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The third essay of the Genealogy purports to explain the ascetic ideal, and its 
most refined and extreme form, the scientific— wissenschaftlich, scholarly or 
academic—aspiration to tru th . I do not think it is an accident or coincidence 
tha t the Genealogy is the only one of Nietzsche’s mature works tha t looks, 
more or less, like traditional academic writing. (But only more or less: it is 
a series of three essays—Abhandlungen , better rendered as “treatises”8—but 
the tone is off, and it is full of odd parenthetical digressions, eruptions of 
emotion, segues from topic to topic managed by ellipses, and the like.9) The 
Genealogy has a subtitle: it is a Streitschrift, a polemic, tha t is, a literary 
production akin to the popular books written on, for instance, the different 
sides of the nineteenth-century materialism debate (Streit).10 That is, it 
announces itself as a product of the class of persons introduced by the very 
first sentence of the book’s Preface.
“We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge”—‘knowers’ would 
be a less awkward translation, and ‘intelligentsia’ or ‘knowledge workers’ 
might be reasonable renderings in more recent idiom— “and with good rea­
son.”11 This announcement, at the very outset of the book, tells us that 
Nietzsche’s agenda has to do with understanding the “knowers,” and it 
identifies the narrator of the volume as one of the intellectuals or knowledge 
workers: “we men of knowledge,” it says. To be sure, the agenda of the 
Genealogy is also to provide a critique of moral values (P:6), and somehow 
these two agendas must be connected, or tu rn  out to be the same thing. 
But without yet seeing how tha t is the case, we can adopt as our working 
assumption the idea tha t the Genealogy is meant to exhibit the workings of 
a “man of knowledge.”
I am thus agreeing with Alexander Nehamas tha t a productive way to 
approach Nietzsche’s later writings is to ask who the authorial personae they
8Kaufmann is not consistent in his translation of this distinctly academic term, and in 
the note at the end of the first Essay, does render it as “treatise” . That note titles itself 
an Anmerkung, and so is a further allusion to academic prose forms.
9I’m grateful to Candace Vogler for bringing my attention back to this aspect of Niet­
zsche’s writing.
10Not that every Streit is necessarily academic: compare the recent Karikaturenstreit— 
the brouhaha that erupted when cartoons depicting Mohammed were run in a Danish 
newspaper.
11P: 1; in 3:24 he reiterates the self-identification, and elsewhere in the third Essay he 
speaks of “us psychologists” (3:19, 20), perhaps giving us a tighter fix on the kind of 
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project are supposed to be.12 But I differ with Nehamas on two further per­
tinent points. The first of these is his position tha t all of Nietzsche’s texts 
jointly project a single postulated author; this is why I am adducing only 
passages from the Genealogy. (I will touch on my reasons for demurring 
towards the end of sec. 4.) The second is his insistence tha t the authorial 
persona is, in a nontrivial sense, a unified and coherent character. Nehamas 
has a body of theory meant to back up these views, and this is not the 
place to mount a full-fledged argument against it. But the reading of the 
Genealogy which I am advancing is meant as a first move in such a counter­
argument.13
If the narrative voice of the Genealogy is pointedly absent-minded, and if 
the Genealogy is intended to put on display the mind of, perhaps a scholar, 
perhaps an intellectual, then we need to ask why “men of knowledge” are 
as forgetful as all that. There are (at least) two ways of using the resources 
of the Nietzsche corpus to answer this question, but because I want to allow 
this particular text to direct the interpretation, I ’m going to stick to the one 
tha t can be made out using only what the Genealogy provides.14
Suppose you have come to value what Nietzsche calls “intellectual clean­
liness” (3:24), and it is very im portant to you to understand yourself to 
be consistent. There are, if you think about it, two ways to achieve that 
self-understanding. One is actually to be consistent. But this is difficult. 
For one thing, it requires a lot of what we might today imagine as processor 
time: in order to adjust your intellectual assertions and commitments when 
they conflict, you have to keep track of them, and check them against each
12See, e.g., Nehamas, 1985, Nehamas, 1988.
13See especially Nehamas, 1981, and Nehamas, 1987. The nontriviality qualification is 
intended as follows. If a postulated author is shown to be a hodgepodge of inconsistent 
intentions, a fragmented personality, and so on, it is possible to protect the ‘regulative 
ideal’ of ‘critical monism’ by insisting that text coherently projects that. But I take it that 
only more demanding notions of coherence are worth our attention. (For their own part, 
Nehamas’s readings pursue the sort of integration of character exhibited by protagonists 
of the classic nineteenth-century novel.)
14If I am right, they are in any case compatible. The other reason has to do with the way 
thinking (any thinking) requires what in science we regard as idealization and approxima­
tion, which involves, on Nietzsche’s view, forgetting that things are not as you represent 
them. Compare the announcement, at 3:24, that “forcing, adjusting, abbreviating, omit­
ting, padding, inventing, [and] falsifying... [are] of the essence of interpreting.” To have 
a mind—to think— is to forget that things are not as one represents them. And conse­
quently any mind at all will have forgetting as “an active and in the strictest sense positive 
faculty of repression... responsible for the fact that what we experience and absorb enters 
our consciousness as little while we are digesting it (one might call the process ‘inpsy- 
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other, one by one, and in combinations; all in all, it requires you to spend 
limited intellectual resources on searching out and correcting obvious and 
unobvious inconsistencies. More importantly, from Nietzsche’s perspective, 
it involves regimenting one’s internal emotional life. Nietzsche represents 
the person as composed of drives, and drives express themselves not merely 
as urges to the more visible bodily actions, but as opinion and utterance 
(and, a point we will get back to in a moment, evaluation). Resentment 
will exhibit itself not only as an urge to kick its object, but in a lower opin­
ion of its object, as when an artist develops dismissive responses toward 
hostile reviewers (and perhaps adopts a new set of standards on which he 
does well, and the reviewers and competitors do badly). If conflicting (or 
anyway different) drives express themselves in conflicting opinions, then to 
make your theoretical views consistent, one of your drives will have to take 
control of the others. Overcoming this difficulty requires strength (Niet­
zsche’s metaphor, which I am leaving undischarged), and so we can call this 
consistency through strength.
The other way to achieve consistency as far as you are concerned, tha t is, 
to achieve the appearance of consistency, is simply to lose track of your com­
mitments: to forget what you said earlier. This is in some ways much easier 
than the first option, especially if forgetting, as Nietzsche suggests in the 
second Essay, comes naturally. And we can now see why it does. If (certain) 
opinions are tied to particular drives, then when one drive surges forward 
with its opinion, it is also pushing competing drives (along with their as­
sociated opinions) into the background: as Nietzsche remarks, apropos the 
ascetic priests’ not unrelated use of the affects, “the chamber of human 
consciousness is sm alll” (3:18; we need to mark another undischarged and 
Cartesian metaphor here, of the mind as something like a room or a stage.) 
Failure to regiment your drives ruthlessly and completely (or, what in Niet­
zsche’s view comes to the same thing, failure of one drive to subordinate the 
others) produces forgetting as a side effect. Call this consistency through 
weakness.15
Now which route to the appearance of consistency (to consistency as
15 To return briefly to the question of how Nietzsche could have accounted for suspension 
of disbelief: The obvious mechanism is images and the like, which are associated with one 
drive, displacing in consciousness conflicting beliefs associated with other drives. Now, 
if that is the way it is supposed to work, then suspension of disbelief is of a piece with 
forgetting as Nietzsche understands it. We do not know what Nietzsche’s account of 
suspension of disbelief was (or would have been), so the takeaway message is merely 
that we ought not simply to assume that, in Nietzsche’s intellectual world, suspension of 
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far as one is oneself concerned) can we expect the professional knowledge 
worker to take? According to Nietzsche, the man of knowledge is the current 
incarnation of the ascetic ideal, and
the ascetic ideal springs from  the protective instinct o f a degen­
erating l ife ... it indicates a partial physiological obstruction and 
exhaustion... (3:13)
science rests on the same foundation as the ascetic ideal: a 
certain impoverishment o f l i fe .. .the  scholar steps into the fore­
ground [during]... ages of exhaustion... (3:25)
The ascetic ideal can be accounted for as a form of medication (possibly self­
medication) improvised to cope with suffering, sickness and overall depletion 
(3:20f); in fact, one of the therapeutic techniques Nietzsche mentions is “self­
forgetfulness” (3:18). Moreover, Christianity is presented as two millenia 
of training in forgetting (as when you learn to forget tha t you don’t love 
your neighbor, but, rather, hate him ),16 and a contemporary scholar is an 
inheritor of tha t training: roughly, a monk in secular garb. So we should 
expect intellectuals to be quite adept at forgetting, and we should not be 
surprised if, by and large, the form of consistency exhibited by the “men 
of knowledge” is consistency though weakness: managing the appearance of 
consistency by forgetting what one said earlier.
To be sure, the appearance of consistency is not exhausted by having 
fooled oneself. But recall tha t Nietzsche’s readers by and large also fail to 
notice the pattern of inconsistencies having to do with forgetting. How it is 
tha t managed? Let’s grant tha t the recurring outbursts of emotion in the 
text are Nietzsche showing us what the scientific or scholarly personality is 
really like: not nearly as impersonal and objective as the publicity has it. 
In so doing, he is also reminding those of us who eventually notice what is 
going on how we succeed in slipping consistency through weakness past our 
own audiences.
If Nietzsche’s inconsistencies are not noticed, tha t is because his readers 
are swept along by one emotion after another. Nietzsche’s drives are put 
on display in his prose: think of tha t odd moment when he announces 
tha t “Negros... taken as representatives of prehistoric man,” scarcely feel 
pain, and that, for his own part, “[he] has no doubt tha t the combined 
suffering of all the animals ever subjected to the knife for scientific ends 
is utterly negligible compared with one painful night of a single hysterical 
bluestocking” (2:7). Vivisection was a hot-button subject at the time, gender
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roles and social class have long been touchy topics, and race was becoming 
an intensely emotional issue during the period Nietzsche was writing.17
Or again, consider one of the many moments at which the author seems 
to be doing precisely what he seems to be condemning, the point in the text 
where the priests’ ingenuity in revaluing earlier values is described as moti­
vated by poisonous hatred (1:7). The language in which tha t description is 
given is itself vitriolic; poisonous hatred would be a pretty good characteri­
zation of the tone of tha t very passage. And of course the project, or one of 
them, of the Genealogy is a revaluation of values. But just where the juxta­
position of authorial performance and description could be expected to make 
the reader wonder how far he can really take the text at face value, Niet­
zsche swerves into the rhetoric of then-contemporary political antisemitism: 
“All tha t has been done on earth against ‘the noble,’ ‘the powerful,’ ‘the 
masters,’ ‘the rulers,’ fades into nothing compared with what the Jews have 
done against them.” 18 Antisemitism was a politically explosive movement 
at the time, which is to say tha t it was able to evoke powerful affective 
responses—pro and con—from a surprisingly broad public.
Nietzsche is pushing his reader’s buttons. When he invokes his drives, 
they (frequently enough) resonate in his readers, bringing their analogous 
drives to the forefront. Those drives foreground the opinions associated with
17W hat is Nietzsche trying to distract us from at this juncture? A number of possibilities 
come to mind, one of which is the surfeit of explanations for freedom of the will. Later in 
the same section, Nietzsche informs us that free will was invented to make divine interest 
in human life plausible; earlier on, we were told that the free agent was invented to allow 
slaves to blame their ‘evil’ masters (1:13).
18Because the postwar reception of Nietzsche in the United States involved a great deal 
of defensiveness vis-a-vis his (actual or alleged) antisemitism, I had better be explicit about 
just what I am suggesting at this point. I am claiming that Nietzsche is self-consciously 
shifting into a markedly antisemitic register (recall that Nietzsche was quite familiar with 
political antisemitism, by way of the Wagners and his own sister), and I am suggesting 
that he is, also self-consciously, presenting his own psychology as containing (what he 
thinks of as) an antisemitic drive. However, by describing these as tactical choices, I am 
also implying that it would an interpretative mistake to take up the topic of antisemitism 
in Nietzsche by launching into argument about whether he was or he wasn’t. (Apropos, 
but under the heading of tensions built into the text, notice that Nietzsche subsequently 
goes out of his way to insult antisemites, at 2:11, 3:14 and 3:26.)
Nietzsche’s remarks about the Jews provide a further instance of a contradiction in the 
text from which the reader needs to be distracted. The actions of the Jews are described 
in the language of intentional action: e.g., they “dared to invert,” they “were ultimately 
satisfied with nothing less.. . , ” they produced “this most fundamental of all declarations 
of w ar... ” . Only a few sections later, Nietzsche makes the methodological point that 
reifying a natural, psychological or social process into an agent who lies behind the effect 
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them, and so displace the opinions associated with previously foregrounded 
drives. That is, his audiences can be induced to forget because they too 
lack emotional self-control. As Nietzsche reminds us in the second Essay, 
“[o]n the average, a small dose of aggression, malice, or insinuation certainly 
suffices to drive the blood into the eyes—and fairness out of the eyes—of 
even the most upright people” (2:11).
Recall the objection to my reading tha t proceeds from the Principle of Char­
ity. Texts are correctly interpreted when they are charitably interpreted, and 
the Principle of Charity requires one not to impute contradictions to a text 
whenever tha t is at all avoidable. We’re now in a position to explain why 
tha t response is a mistake, and to do so, we need to ask a question that 
has almost entirely dropped out of our collective philosophical awareness: 
Why be charitable? While philosophers are trained to apply and invoke the 
Principle, if you ask almost any professional philosopher for a justification, 
you’ll get reiterated insistence, but not an argument.19 But we should not 
apply the methods we were taught in graduate school merely by reflex.
The Principle of Charity was reintroduced into our literary tradition in 
the middle ages, as an interpretive methodology developed for one text in 
particular. The Bible came with a theological guarantee of infallibility, and 
so here the exegetical technique was warranted by prior knowledge tha t the 
word of God could not contain errors, and consequently could not contain 
contradictions. That is, originally, the use of the Principle was warranted 
by a feature of the text tha t made it appropriate, namely, its divine author­
ship.20
I have just argued tha t we have in front of us a text constructed to ex-
19There are a handful of exceptions, of which perhaps the most interesting is Donald 
Davidson. His argument for using the Principle of Charity depends, in its developed form, 
on the view that theories of meaning have to have the form of Tarski-style tru th  theories, 
and that the evidence to which a theory of meaning must consequently be responsible con­
sists in Tarski-style T-sentences. These have to be collected more or less from observation, 
and to do this, without already drawing on a theory of meaning, requires supposing the 
subjects of the theory to be more or less correct in their utterances (Davidson, 1984; for 
another reconstruction of Davidson’s reasons, see Sorensen, 2001, pp. 132f). Two points 
m atter for our purposes. The first is that this argument for Charity deploys a great deal of 
theoretical baggage, and you have to be a die-hard Davidsonian to find the argument per­
suasive. The second is that almost no one, I have found, is aware that Davidson actually 
does have an argument.
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hibit a particular personality type at work. That personality type, we know 
from the historical account Nietzsche is providing us, is one for whom ac­
tual consistency should be nearly impossible, and the illusion of consistency 
almost inevitable. That is, the very sort of justification tha t originally ac­
companied the Principle of Charity (a view about the fabrication of the text 
to which it is to be applied) justifies, in this case, not applying the Princi­
ple. For a text fabricated to exhibit the tendency of a personality type to 
inconsistency should be expected to exhibit inconsistencies, and we should 
not count it against the interpretation of such a text tha t they are found.
I do not mean to suggest tha t the reading of the Genealogy which I have 
been developing is exhaustive or complete; of course there is much more 
going on, most notably, the ethical theorizing tha t has attracted the atten­
tion of, by now, several generations of commentators. However, because 
the theory is presented to us by what I have been arguing is intended as 
an erratic narrator, and because the theory makes up the backstory of that 
narrator, the present interpretation complicates the task of making out Ni­
etzsche’s theoretical claims, and so further complicates our understanding 
of the author himself. I earlier remarked tha t Nietzsche offers us in passing 
something on the order of a Liar Paradox, and what we have here looks 
to be a still larger and more elaborate variation on one: the body of the­
ory with which we are presented explains why we should understand the 
narrator to be extremely unreliable, and defuses appeals to the Principle of 
Charity; but the theory is presented to us by tha t very narrator, and if he 
is as unreliable as all that, how much of it can we believe? I do not here 
want to try  to settle the question of whether there is a stable reading to be 
had, or if the Genealogy is, on the contrary, constructed in order to preempt 
one. (The latter option would not be philosophically unprecedented: for ex­
ample, Hume’s Treatise is arguably built to flip-flop between incompatible 
readings.) For our purposes it suffices that, once the theoretical backstory 
is in play, we have enough to make bracketing the Principle of Charity no 
more than respect for the text in front of us.
Earlier on, I put to one side the question of how an investigation tha t begins 
with a worry about the self-understanding of knowers could be a critique of 
morality. That question should by now be considerably more urgent. How 
could a treatise tha t exhibits a moment-to-moment inability to remember 
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shoddy as that, why should we take its conclusion seriously, whatever it is?
In answering this question, I hope also to explain how Nietzsche’s critique 
of morality can avoid falling into either of two well-known traps. On the 
one hand, Nietzsche’s commentators have been concerned tha t the problem 
with morality evidently has to do, somehow, with the people who invented 
it and who use it; but in tha t case, why is it not just an ad hominem  or 
genetic argument—both fallacies?21
On the other hand, his interpreters worry about what we can call moral- 
ism , tha t is, making the reconstructed critique depend on the very moral 
evaluations tha t it is attacking. We can illustrate the worry with two re­
cently discussed proposals for explaining the force of his criticism. Suppose 
it is suggested tha t the problem with morality is tha t its producers or con­
sumers are self-deceiving. Why isn’t the negative evaluation of self-deception 
tha t the criticism is inviting one to evince a moral one? Suppose it is sug­
gested tha t the problem with morality is tha t the ressentim ent-driven agent 
is engaged in a self-frustrating course of action. Why isn’t a preoccupation 
with efficiency and effectiveness merely a marker of some personality types 
and social strata—and not necessarily the ones Nietzsche seems to have 
found admirable? (The nobility don’t worry themselves about such things: 
“what,” Nietzsche asks rhetorically, “had they to do with utility!”)22 And 
there is a related issue of which we will want to keep track: Nietzsche com­
plains tha t morality is one-size-fits-all; why won’t the negative assessment 
of morality be subject to just such a complaint itself?
Recall tha t drives, according to the Genealogy, express themselves not
21 See, e.g., Solomon, 1994, pp. 96f, Solomon, 1996. The term ‘argument ad hominem'' 
has more than one sense; the one I have in mind here involves conflating personal aspersions 
cast on one’s opponent ( “You’re ugly and your mother dresses you funny”—that sort 
of thing) with a refutation of his view. The worry here is not just that it would be 
uncharitable to ascribe such a clumsy fallacy to Nietzsche, but that he himself insists that 
one ought to disregard the producer when assessing the work (at any rate when we are 
considering artists, but it is hard to see why the point would not generalize: 3:4). The 
analogous concern about genetic fallacies can be anchored in what is sometimes cast as 
Nietzsche’s discussion of genealogical methodology at 2:12-13, where he insists that “the 
cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and place in 
a system of purposes, lie worlds apart.”
There is a special class of cases, discussed at Millgram, 2002, p. 182, for which ad 
hominem  arguments are legitimate, and on some readings of Nietzsche, his arguments are 
confined to those cases. I propose to defer this line of inquiry to another occasion.
221:2; “utility” translates Nutzlichkeit, so notice the immediately subsequent paraphrase 
as berechnende Klugheit. For both of the suggestions I have just entertained, see Reginster, 
1997. Reginster takes his second suggestion—that this particular form of self-deception 
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only in action and opinion, but in producing systems of evaluation. I re­
marked tha t garden-variety resentment colors your evaluations of the people 
you resent; on a larger scale, ressentim ent, Nietzsche claims, has given rise 
to a system of evaluations (with an elaborate accompanying theology), the 
system of evaluation tha t we call morality. Nietzsche attributes a very im­
portant part of the invention of morality to the priestly classes, and the 
priests, the third Essay of the Genealogy explains to us, are the predeces­
sors of contemporary intellectuals and their scholarship.23 Science is just 
the “latest and noblest” form of the ascetic ideal cultivated by the priestly 
class (3:23).
Once we see how systems of moral and intellectual standards are pro­
duced and held together, we should expect the earlier evaluative inventions 
of the religious castes to have been no less shoddy than the productions of 
contemporary “men of knowledge.”24 This point appeals to the origin of 
morality without committing a genetic fallacy, tha t is, without confusing 
the value of the source with the value of the product: examining the origin 
of morality shows how its mode of production predictably leaves its imprint 
on the product. There is all the difference in the world between treating a 
dismissive assessment of an opponent as itself a refutation of his views, and 
constructing a plausible argument from tha t assessment to the inevitable 
inadequacy or unsatisfactoriness of whatever views he comes up with.
Recall who the Genealogy is addressing: “we men of knowledge.” If 
you are a product of the line of historical development Nietzsche has been 
describing, you care about intellectual cleanliness. Once you see how shoddy 
the system of moral values is bound to be, you have all the answer you 
need to the question posed in Nietzsche’s Preface, W hat value do the value 
judgements good and evil possess?25 A Nietzschean critique of the value of
23There may be individual exceptions; “with noble men cleverness can easily acquire a 
subtle flavor of luxury” (1:11), and surely intellectual pursuits might be taken up as an 
upper-class hobby.
24Recall Nietzsche’s remark, at 2:11, to the effect that the reactive man is bound to 
take a false and prejudiced view of the object before him.
Notice, however, that the argument I am now sketching does not require the premise 
that all the priestly knowledge workers of the past were intellectually incompetent in the 
ways we have had on display; it suffices that, in the course of the collective enterprise of 
fabricating, transmitting and reappropriating values, enough were to guarantee (or almost 
guarantee) a product that is shoddy by the standards of contemporary intellectuals.
25To return to our examples of moralistic interpretation: when Reginster claims that 
Nietzsche’s critique of ressentiment-dhven morality has bite because such morality turns 
out to involve self-deception, he does not pause to consider who is going to care about self­
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values will not forget whose values it is invoking as a standard.
If Nietzsche meant to address his criticisms of morality not just to a 
class of overeducated intellectuals, if his critiques operate by exhibiting the 
implied authors or narrators of his books, and if the critique developed in 
the Genealogy appeals to and turns on values tha t are shared primarily by 
overeducated intellectuals, then we should expect Nietzsche’s mature writ­
ings to project different authorial personae—personae capable of supporting 
critiques addressed to different audiences. The Genealogy of Morals is a very 
sophisticated critique of morality— fo r intellectuals, and tha t is because it 
is, at the same time, an expose of the intellectuals themselves.
It remains to take up the very indirect and apparently patchy form of the 
argument as I have reconstructed it. Allow tha t the heart of the argument 
really is this: tha t the fabricators of our moral and intellectual values cannot 
have been expected to deliver a product tha t lives up to standards such as 
internal consistency and coherence; tha t intellectuals such as yourself, the 
reader, care about niceties of this sort; and consequently tha t you have rea­
son to reject our moral and intellectual values. Then why doesn’t Nietzsche 
just say that? Furthermore, why bother with the roundabout argument that 
our moral and intellectual values must almost certainly be internally inco­
herent, etc.? Why not just demonstrate directly (in the way tha t Voltaire 
and his followers had tried to, for the religious ideology they inherited) that 
they are? And finally, even if some intellectuals (and their priestly prede­
cessors) are as scatterbrained as I am claiming the author makes himself out 
to be, how can he be so sure tha t his own readers are?
I do not think I can tie the suggestion I am about to make nearly as 
closely to the text as I have the argument up to this point. Nonetheless, 
the answer I am about to give is a way of tying up our loose ends, and 
worth considering for tha t reason. I have already alluded to Nietzsche’s 
complaint tha t morality prescribes the same medicine for everybody, and 
drawn the conclusion tha t we should not expect him to prescribe the same 
philosophical medication for everybody. We have to let the Genealogy tell 
us who it is written for: as it turns out, not just any ‘men of knowledge,’ 
but those who will respond to a particular sort of shock treatment.
Nietzsche was quite aware tha t there is only so much you can do with 
straight philosophical argumentation.26 If he has correctly anticipated his
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readers’ intellectual failings, nothing on the order of ordinary argument will 
suffice: his readers will be all too prone to forget the conclusion itself, or 
crucial bits and pieces of the argument, or the failings of an unsatisfactory 
counterargument. In particular, Nietzsche would have been very aware that 
inconsistencies can be explained away. Intellectuals are very good at this, 
partly because they’re often trained in it; so when you try  to insist on 
inconsistencies in their system of values, you get, not acknowledgement, but 
theologizing, and centuries of it.27 (Indeed, you may have experienced the 
impulse tha t Nietzsche is trying to preempt. When I presented what I ’ve 
been claiming are pointed contradictions in Nietzsche’s text, did you find 
yourself looking around for explanations tha t would make them out to be 
not really inconsistencies after all?) If I am right, Nietzsche hopes to bypass 
this response, and the way he seems to think he can do tha t is to catch 
the reader out: you are set up, and when you finally notice what has been 
going on, your sudden awareness of your own lack of intellectual acuity is 
supposed to bring you up short. That is, in order to make his conclusion 
stick, Nietzsche is attem pting to elicit an emotional response.
Nietzsche’s writing is often read smugly, as an attem pt to partition its 
audience into a sophisticated elite and naive outsiders. But if my suspicion 
is on target, we should not take Nietzsche to be exempting readers of the 
Genealogy from the shortcomings of run-of-the-mill ‘men of knowledge’. If 
the Genealogy works as I have been suggesting, the audience for whom 
the book is in the first place written must be just those who are liable to 
fall into the trap: those who fail, at the outset, to notice the pattern of 
inconsistencies; who eventually do notice; and who are embarrassed enough 
to acquiesce in the point tha t is being made about them. If you are an 
intellectual who is not disposed to produce these responses, for instance, if 
you approach Nietzsche from what he sometimes describes as an underlying 
‘great health’, then Nietzsche has written a different book for you—probably, 
The Gay Science.
philosophers’ struggle against the feeling of displeasure.
Given how dismissive Nietzsche can be about consciousness, why think that his philo­
sophical therapy is intended to operate in ways of which his readers will be aware? (I’m 
grateful to Ken Gemes for raising this concern.) Here is one reason: the elaborately con­
structed booby traps I have been displaying will not be effective if they are not appreciated, 
and appreciating them requires noticing them.
2'Nietzsche describes an instance of the problem in the guise of autobiography. As 
a child he was preoccupied with the Problem of Evil (P:3); the Problem looks like a 
straightforward contradiction; religious academics treat it as an occasion for theory; Ni­
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For related reasons, we ought not to take Nietzsche to be exempting 
himself from those shortcomings. Nietzsche has every strategic incentive 
to avoid making himself out to be holier-than-thou (and responsiveness to 
those incentives is exhibited when, for instance, he includes himself among 
the “tame domestic animals,” at 2:6). In catching his audience with its 
pants down, Nietzsche must go out of his way not to elicit the wrong emo­
tional responses. This particular audience’s psyches are supposed to be built 
around ressentiment. If he were just to manipulate his readers into tripping 
over their own feet, but present himself the way tha t academic authors nor­
mally do (as fully in control of their own prose, and above clumsy mistakes 
in reasoning), he would be all too likely to elicit resentful rejection. So Ni­
etzsche presents himself as intellectually fallible partly in order to disarm 
a certain kind of resistance, and this is a further reason for his use of the 
first-person plural in tha t opening line, which I will repeat one last time: 
“We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge.”
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